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REVISITING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: THE 
URGENT CASE FOR POLITICAL PARTY THINK TANKS 
Irvin Studin* 
During the course of his long years in power, Bismarck 
brought his ministerial colleagues into unconditional 
bureaucratic dependence by eliminating all independent 
statesmen.  Upon his retirement, he saw to his surprise that 
they continued to manage their offices unconcerned and 
undismayed, as if he had not been the master mind and 
creator of these creatures, but rather as if some single figure 
had been exchanged for some other figure in the bureaucratic 
machine. 
Max Weber, Wirthschaft und Gesellschaft (1922) 
Barring a major new war, the year 2007-2008 may well be remembered in 
history as one of political transitions—changes in government—for the 
West’s major democracies.  Before Kevin Rudd, the newly elected prime 
minister of Australia, there was Gordon Brown in the United Kingdom, 
and also Nicolas Sarkozy in France.  By the end of calendar 2008, we will 
have a newly elected president of the United States and, in all likelihood, a 
general election in our own Canada.  (New Zealand, for the record, will 
also have a general election by mid-November of 2008.  Gordon Brown 
may also call a general election.)   
* Irvin Studin, a Rhodes Scholar, was the first-ever recruit of the Privy Council Office
targeted recruitment campaign—now known as the Recruitment of Policy Leaders 
programme—in 2002.  He worked at the Privy Council Office as a foreign and security 
policy specialist between 2002 and 2006, and as a secondee in the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet of the Australian Government in Canberra between 2005 and 
2006.  Studin is the editor of What is a Canadian:  Forty-Three Thought-Provoking 
Responses (Douglas Gibson Books, McClelland & Stewart, 2006).  He is currently based 
at Osgoode Hall Law School at Toronto’s York University, where he lectures.      
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 Transitions of government—peaceful transitions of government—
after free and fair elections are the very lifeblood of modern democratic 
life.  That much is reasonably clear.  A government is elected on the 
strength of undertakings made to the voting public, which in turn is 
supposed to hold the government to account for such undertakings and for 
its general competence.  The logic appears tight—assailable not on 
principles, although perhaps in the details…  Is it? 
 
Conceding the battle on principles, let us look at details—for much 
of Canada’s governance happens in the bowels, well beneath the 
rambunctious veneer of parliamentary repartee and media bons mots…  
This article will seek to make the case for a more powerful or empowered 
political executive in Canada—at least at the federal level.  It will argue 
that our political parties are in dire need of designated policy think tanks—
preferably state-funded tanks—in order that they be able to form stronger, 
deeper and, most importantly, more consistently prepared governments 
when they come to power.  The case being made, therefore, is that a more 
effective political executive is the critical lynchpin in strengthening 
modern Canadian democracy.   
 
All this clearly goes against the grain of the conventional or 
accepted wisdom of recent political debates in Canada about the soi-disant 
‘democratic deficit,’ and is contrary to the general thrust of public and 
academic critiques of Canadian government going back to at least the 
1970s—most of which have, in one form or another, stressed the 
democratic virtue of defanging an increasing large and potent executive.  
Part of this proposed defanging often involves bolstering the role of 
legislative branch, or Parliament:  the effectiveness of its committees, the 
voting freedom of members and, more recently, the system by which 
members are elected and hence its composition and representativeness. 
 
 The ‘democratic deficit’ of the last decade or so has traditionally 
been attributed to the “friendly dictatorship” of the executive branch of the 
federal government.  The typical ill associated with Canadian government 
and governance at large on this view of the world has been the apparent 
excess of political and administrative power vested in the prime minister 
and his supporting machinery—to wit, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 
and the Privy Council Office (PCO), both of which are apparently all too 
disposed to usurping power from other branches of government—
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especially Parliament—but also from other parts of the executive—that is, 
from other ministries, and even from full Cabinet.  The apparent 
usurpation of power from Parliament, of course, has garnered the most 
political and media attention, and suggests a weakening of the democratic 
structure of our Westminister system of (responsible) government—one in 
which an effective Parliament is able to meaningfully hold the executive to 
account. 
 
 This discourse of an ‘emasculated’ or ‘irrelevant’ Parliament has a 
long history.  Indeed, as early as 1969, then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
said that “[w]hen they are fifty yards from Parliament Hill, [Members of 
Parliament] are no longer honourable members, they are just nobodies.”  
Pearson before him spoke of executive dictatorship in the context of 
Canadian democracy, but the modern discourse begins specifically with 
Trudeau, as it was the Trudeau government that introduced the elaborate 
cabinet committee system which ushered in the modern power era of the 
three central agencies in Ottawa—Finance, Treasury Board and, in 
particular, the PCO.  Along with its political annex in the form of the 
PMO, the PCO became primus inter pares in the art of “governing from 
the centre”—principally on the strength of its control of the cabinet 
committee process, including full Cabinet.  To the Clerk of the Privy 
Council—head of the PCO and also chief bureaucratic advisor to the 
Prime Minister (leaving aside his role as head of the entire public 
service)—eventually accrued more administrative power than that of most 
Cabinet ministers, and the degree of dependence on the Clerk by more 
powerful men and women like the Prime Minister and the chief of staff to 
the Prime Minister became an undeniable, but (critically) little understood, 
fact of Canadian political life.   
 
Because governments since Trudeau have both developed and 
advanced their broad policy agendae primarily through the modern cabinet 
committee process, mid- to high-level officials in the PCO have also 
become extremely powerful players in government, influencing not only 
the substance of policy discussions, but providing final 
recommendations—given effective delegated authority from the Clerk, 
and via the implied imprimatur of the Prime Minister—to chairs of cabinet 
committees on what policies and directions should be approved (or not) 
and, less widely appreciated, accelerating or decelerating the pace at 
which a given file or issue weaves its way through the increasingly 
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complex cabinet committee system, depending on the interplay of political 
and bureaucratic imperatives and intrigue.  Under any given government, 
there may be between half a dozen and a dozen such committees—both 
standing and ad hoc.  They cover the entire gamut of policy issues faced 
by the country (at least from the federal perspective), from national 
security and foreign affairs to economic, social and environmental 
questions, and even national unity.  And each of these committees is 
supported by at least one secretariat (and sometimes more than one) within 
the PCO, which is populated by a not insignificant number of policy 
professionals—civil servants with strong experience of government and 
often with specific policy expertise.  These civil servants usually take the 
lead in setting the lion’s share of the agendae for cabinet committee 
meetings and, in many cases, meetings of full cabinet.  They also manage 
virtually all of the paperwork leading up to, and issuing from, these 
meetings.  This monopoly or mastery of the process of government by 
elite civil servants is, again, little understood, but absolutely essential to a 
proper appreciation of how modern government in Canada really works. 
 
 For the most part, full cabinet in this system tends to receive policy 
advice or recommendations for consideration for which most of the details 
have already been plied by officials in PCO (primarily) and the other 
central agencies (secondarily), with support from other specialized 
ministries (so-called ‘line departments’), each of which, significantly, can 
call on the expertise and incumbency of a large number of policy 
professionals in their own ranks.  The policy marge de manoeuvre for 
cabinet ministers and their political officials in this structure of decision-
making is thus quite limited.  They provide general ‘thematic’ or ‘value’ 
direction, intervene substantively (although often superficially) on major 
priority files, and do their best to ‘put out fires,’ where these can be 
predicted, on highly sensitive files.  Where battles are fought over 
particular files, ministers must be selective, as the number of files passing 
through the committee system is very large, and does not permit of 
considerable recycling of processes and debates.  (Most files will only 
come to a given committee once—and for expected approval only.)  Some 
ministers and political officials, including in the PMO, if deft and not 
distracted, will anticipate disagreements on particular issues prior to 
committee meetings, and will work out problems ‘on the side.’  But again, 
a significant majority of the details of policy are proposed, discussed and 
‘ironed out’ at the bureaucratic level, mediated by the centre, and iterated 
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through interdepartmental meetings, committees and consultations at 
levels that are well below the levels not only of the senior bureaucracy, but 
of cabinet ministers, their political officials and the PMO.  The Clerk, 
through his officials in the PCO, is, for all practical intents and purposes, 
the master of this process of policy development and approval. 
 
In addition to control of the cabinet committee process, the PCO, 
supported by the entire government policy bureaucracy, plays a massive 
role in developing the effective government agenda by, first and foremost, 
providing what is called ‘transition advice’ to an incoming prime minister:  
thick policy books on everything from machinery of government through 
to economic policy, social policy and foreign and security policy.  These 
policy books, although not usually ‘cutting edge’ or ‘revolutionary,’ 
typically provide a comprehensive brief on the state of the country (or the 
federal ministries) and strong advice on the preparation of a policy agenda 
for a new government.  While the Clerk, aided by PCO officials, usually 
dominates this process, the said advice, critically, usually incorporates the 
input of most ministries of government, particularly at senior (deputy or 
assistant deputy minister) levels, supported in turn by the input of large 
complements of lower policy analysts in the various ministries.  This 
transition advice often provides detailed commentary on the electoral 
platform (promises) and the anticipated priorities of an incoming prime 
minister.  Such advice will often take a position—a yea, nay or maybe—
on the ‘doability’ or ‘wisdom’ or ‘reasonableness’ of a certain initiative or 
policy proposed during an election.  It may also—and this is certainly not 
unheard of—take positions on issues or files independently of, or 
notwithstanding, the electoral promises made by the party in power:  that 
is, it may propose a policy agenda that, while politically sensitive, is 
reflective of the very best advice of the bureaucracy.  In the aggregate, this 
final package or product is intended to both impress the incoming prime 
minister in respect of the competence of his or her civil service (and the 
PCO, his ministry, in particular) and to impress upon the prime minister 
that the civil service’s advice (its position) is supported by serious policy 
professionals—technocrats, if you will—from across government:  in 
other words, that it is ‘good’ advice, that it is legitimate.  And that he or 
she would be wise to strongly consider it. 
 
So a lot, as mentioned, happens below the surface and radar of the 
political (elected) level—and clearly well before ever reaching Parliament 
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and the public.  This is, of course, as it must be, for the most part, in our 
Westminster system:  a professional, largely anonymous, discreet and 
politically neutral civil service speaks ‘truth to power,’ with the key 
executive processes of government decision-making headquartered in the 
PCO (or cabinet office), and with much of the advice either being 
provided directly by the PCO or through the PCO after consultation or 
brokering with more specialist line departments.  The essential point, 
however, for our purposes, is that the advice proffered by the civil service 
is more often than not supported not only by a very large number—dare I 
say, an army—of policy professionals (technocrats) with longstanding 
experience (incumbency) in specific areas of policy (e.g. foreign affairs, 
national security or tax policy), but also a bureaucratic apparatus which 
profits from a very fine division of labour both within individual ministries 
and across the entire leviathan of government.  And here we get to the 
heart of the matter:  This prolific division of labour allows the civil 
service, in preparing advice for the government—whether in the context of 
transition or that of day-to-day government—to analyze any given policy 
issue or problem from a myriad of perspectives—typically with each 
section or division of a (relevant) ministry providing analysis from its 
perspective and, in turn, each (relevant) ministry providing aggregated 
analysis from the ministry’s perspective, with PCO contradicting, 
challenging, coordinating or collating these different perspectives to 
provide a so-called ‘whole-of-government’ view on a given matter.  (As a 
general rule, ‘whole-of-ministry’ advice on specific files, similarly, is 
given on a regular basis to cabinet ministers and their political officials in 
their given ministries.  Such advice only passes through PCO only if, and 
to the extent that, it touches on the overall government agenda or involves 
peculiar political sensitivities.)   
 
A gross truism at this point in today’s globalization discourse is 
that as our country and our world become ever complex, the scale of 
bureaucracy needed to tackle given issues grows—often exponentially.  
Witness the massive increase in national security and defence 
bureaucracies in the West in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Al-
Qaeda attacks on the United States.  These modern bureaucracies in both 
the private and public sectors are indispensable to modern societies in 
virtue of the very fact that they are ‘stable’ (that is, they have standing 
capacities and well-rehearsed internal rules and regulations) and are 
equipped with a prolific division of labour—one that can be increased with 
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relative ease—to tackle modern problems.  (Said Weber:  “The needs of 
mass administration make it today completely indispensable.  The choice 
is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of 
administration.”)  In short, an army of bureaucrats awaits for any given 
issue—and many of them, having been bureaucrats for sustained periods 
of time, may become very specialized indeed in a given aspect of a 
particular issue, or even sub-issue.  By their very nature, bureaucracies can 
call on the services of many such specialists—incumbents, if you will—to 
tackle most species of problems.   
 
Enter politics and the need for a democratically elected executive 
(prime minister and cabinet).  Conventional renderings of this executive 
hold that, in the context of the Westminster system and a parliamentary 
majority, the prime minister and the PMO will jealously control the 
apparatus of government and—with limited debate and compromise—ram 
their agenda through or, on occasion, around, a Parliament in which 
members are largely powerless and parties generally disciplined.  So, the 
argument goes, there must be a democratic deficit.  Moves to bolster the 
muscle and ‘legitimacy’ of Parliament are mooted.  Various arm’s length 
bodies are stood up to oversee and audit government.  Public inquiries are 
launched to investigate abuses of executive power.   
 
Allow me to stir a little, however, and humbly propose that the 
fundamental problem with this conventional view of politics and public 
administration in Canada is that it severely understates or completely 
ignores the centrality—the dominant centrality, if you will—of the 
standing bureaucracy, with PCO as its hub, in the policy-making process 
in Ottawa.  The power of this bureaucracy, as mentioned, comes from two 
key facts:  incumbency and division of power.  Both of these facts are 
amoral:  neither good nor bad in and of themselves; rather, they are true of 
most serious, modern bureaucracies, and particularly true of the biggest 
bureaucracy of them all—that of a large, central government.  Incumbency 
means that many bureaucrats, having been in their ministries, their area of 
policy or in ‘the system’ (the civil service) for sustained periods of time, 
know their issues ‘cold’ and, just as importantly, know the levers and 
valves—the norms, rules, regulations and processes—of the administrative 
behemoth called the ‘federal government.’  They have a strong sense of 
what can be done and what cannot reasonably be done, given the 
constraints of the system.  And, quite naturally, human nature oblige, they 
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are not bereft of biases—some more implicit than others—as to what 
should be done and what should not be done, irrespective of which party is 
in power, and even if they may lack a specific public ‘mandate’ to advance 
such biases.         
 
On the other hand, an elected government—especially a newly 
elected government—is typically populated by a prime minister who, by 
virtue of a certain political experience and professional training, may well 
have become a policy specialist or ‘wonk’ in one or more areas (although 
not necessarily in any), and a cabinet comprised of individuals who are not 
necessarily specialist in any area of policy—let alone the area of policy 
occupied by their particular ministries.  Policy expertise aside, none of 
these individuals, including perhaps the prime minister, necessarily has 
any administrative experience in government.  Perhaps just as signally, the 
political officials supporting the prime minister in the PMO, and those 
who populate ministers’ offices (mostly party loyalists), also often have 
limited specific policy expertise and limited experience in government.  
Their understanding of the actual functioning of government is more often 
than not poor, ab initio, if not altogether naïve.  (Needless to say, almost:  
opposition is a poor training ground for government.) 
 
Seen against the incumbency and division of labour of a 
bureaucracy that, in the context of our complex society, is ever large—
even leaving aside its inherent tendency to self-reproduce—today’s real 
democratic deficit seems plain:  the political executive is weak, thin and 
unarmed.  It is ill-equipped to govern, public appearances of ‘competence’ 
notwithstanding.  For it soon finds the ship of state exceedingly difficult to 
steer, and meaningful changes of course in that ship, even if promised and 
legitimated in the course of a properly fought election, often very difficult 
to execute.  The idea, then, that a party, when coming to power or even 
when well established in power, can easily give robust ‘orders’ or 
‘direction’ to the bureaucracy, and that the latter will simply ‘administer’ 
or ‘implement’ now begins to appear quite abstract indeed…     
 
A prime minister and party may come to power with a small set of 
priorities, typically approved through election, and underpinned by a 
presumed value system or framework for decision-making on non-priority 
files.  In reality, however, once in government, they quickly discover that 
it takes a while to figure out how the ‘internal’ policy decision-making 
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system in Ottawa actually works (from policy development processes and 
meetings to cabinet committees to Cabinet approval), that a good number 
of its electoral promises—even priorities—are unrealistic or just ill-
advised (at least according to the civil service brief), and that the civil 
service—whether openly recalcitrant or not—already has a very large 
number of issues and files of its own—longstanding files, in many cases—
that it is proposing to advance through the new government, usually 
irrespective of which party is in government.  A debate may ensue 
between political and bureaucratic levels on specific files, or in respect of 
specific policy recommendations:  barring gratuitous use of political 
authority, the bureaucratic level, by dint of incumbency and division of 
labour, frequently wins the day on the perceived merit of the argument.  
The political level—short of policy rebuttals and ill at ease with the 
process levers of the system—takes the brief.  It now takes cues—on both 
policy and administration—from the bureaucracy.  The dynamic of 
government is set; the Procrustean bed of Canadian policy-making is 
made.  The political executive, in extremis, becomes a talking piece for the 
bureaucratic machine.     
 
This description evidently oversimplifies matters a little—if only 
to better illustrate the argument in the article.  Granted, the political 
executive will on occasion give firm and effective instruction on specific 
matters, and, having considered and analyzed a problem thoroughly, know 
exactly what it wants, up to the last detail.  However, this is more the 
exception in Canadian government than the general rule.  And this rule is 
that the elected political executive—prime minister, cabinet ministers, and 
the political officials in their charge—is on most policy and administrative 
matters well outflanked, outmaneuvered and, over time, ensnared, by a 
bureaucratic apparatus that has most angles covered.  For every rhetorical 
volley fired by the prime minister or a cabinet minister, and for every 
‘two-pager’ of analysis prepared by a political party in support of an 
election promise or a proposed policy initiative, the bureaucracy is 
equipped with dozens, scores or even hundreds of pages of analysis—
often iterated and refined over several years.  And it can mobilize this 
analysis to either affirm or contradict the election promise or proposed 
initiative.  If it wishes to contradict or oppose the government on a matter 
of policy, then it may well ‘speak truth to power.’  Failing this—and this is 
not seldom the case—it may exploit its intimate knowledge of the 
processes of government to frustrate the progress of the file in question.  
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(In the case of a minority government or a government in its late stages, 
the civil service could simply choose to ‘game’ the government on a 
particular contentious matter; in other words, to ‘wait the government 
out.’)  The political executive may well be left wondering why things are 
moving so slowly, if at all—especially given the civil service’s apparent 
duty to faithfully implement ‘government policy.’  If, on the other hand, 
the bureaucracy affirms or supports an initiative, it is then usually tasked 
by the government with filling in the details—details that the political 
executive has not thought through (time and capacity constraints oblige), 
and which are critical to the meaningful delivery of an electoral promise.  
After all, a two-pager does not a policy make! 
 
But what of legitimacy—specifically democratic legitimacy?  The 
key democratic deficit posited in this article consists in the idea that the 
political executive in our present political system and culture—one in 
which the civil service has the overwhelming policy advantage over the 
government of the day—is ill-equipped to meaningfully deliver on any 
large-scale, complex policy agenda of its own making.  (By complex 
policy, I do not have in mind mere legislative tinkering or small, sporadic 
amendments of taxation rates—although these are not bereft of their own 
‘knock-on’ complications.  Instead, I refer to major changes or reforms in 
areas like social policy, foreign policy, environmental policy, etc.)  If such 
a large-scale policy agenda is promised to the electorate in the course of a 
general election, all the worse:  what is the point of a month-long series of 
national debates and convulsions over a series of policy promises or 
‘directions’ that can nary be delivered in any recognizable form?  Does the 
election not reduce to an exercise in political communications and 
imagery?  The link—the democratic link—between the reasonable 
expectations of the electorate, based on the articulated policy 
commitments of the parties aspiring to power, and the actual policy 
capacity of the parties when in power proves to be tenuous indeed… 
 
So we have our problématique:  the democratic deficit lies in the 
fundamental asymmetry or incongruity or imbalance between the 
legitimacy of the elected political executive and the overwhelming policy-
cum-administrative power of the modern unelected bureaucracy.  This 
imbalance necessarily grows as the policy environment becomes more 
complex:  files require increasing degrees of expertise, and the 
incumbency and division of power advantages of the bureaucracy become 
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ever significant—unless, of course, the political executive itself becomes 
far more sophisticated.  Rectification of this democratic deficit, it follows, 
must lie in a redressing of this imbalance:  as suggested at the very start of 
the article, measures must be taken to arm the political executive—more 
precisely, the parties that may each one day make up the political 
executive—with the tools that will allow it to more effectively create and 
advance deep and rigorous policy. 
 
This article argues for the standing up of one serious, dedicated 
policy think tank for each political party—or at least one for each of the 
four or five major political parties at the federal level.  (Let us simply call 
these the “Liberal Policy Institute,” the “Conservative Policy Institute,” 
etc., or something of similar ilk.)  Far more meaningfully than the current 
regime of political party ‘research,’ these permanent thinks tanks, housed 
in proper quarters, would seek to provide each party with deep, standing 
policy capacity—capacity that could be mobilized or tapped on an 
ongoing basis or at any time by the leader of the party, whether in 
government or in opposition.  If in government, these think tanks would 
provide the political executive with a muscular foil to the civil service 
brief, and would be capable of developing substantive, highly detailed and 
‘doable’ policy plans—plans that would form the basis of the 
government’s instructions to the bureaucracy.  These plans could go so far 
as to provide the government with draft memoranda to cabinet (MCs) and 
draft lines for legislation, as well as detailed implementation schemes.  In 
the event, the bureaucracy would still play its rightful role of speaking 
truth to power and providing due diligence, but it would on most files of 
import be reckoning (or arguing) with a far better prepared political 
executive:  one which has thought through most of the fine points of the 
different elements of its policy agenda (acts of God aside, naturally), and 
which is highly deliberate in steering this agenda through the labyrinthine 
decision-making structures of the bureaucracy.           
 
Power and—second-best—the anticipation of power make the 
think tanks and their work most relevant.  Depending on the file or 
problem, the government lets its people in the party think tank know what 
it needs and what the state of affairs (the reality) is inside government.  
The think tank, in turn, can produce—again, if the party leader wants it to 
produce.  Out of power, the think tank could be used by parties to prepare 
in significant, practical detail the elements of a potential agenda for 
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governing.  Far better than the usual ad hoc task forces and country-wide 
‘round tables’ that political parties typically employ on shoe-string budget 
to develop ideas for future platforms, a serious political think tank would 
provide the party with its own little standing (professional) army of 
specialists in various policy areas who could consult, brainstorm, develop 
and iterate ideas and plans over the course of a sustained period of time, in 
preparation, hopefully, for power.  And indeed, it is the expectation of 
power that would ideally bring discipline and realism to these ideas and 
plans.    
 
Who would populate the party think tanks?  Critically, they would 
be populated mostly by thinkers with significant practical experience of 
government.  In other words, the majority of the analysts and planners in 
the tanks would be former middle- to upper-level civil servants and 
erstwhile political officials with considerable understanding of the 
mechanics of government and, ideally, real expertise in one or more areas 
of public policy.  All of them would have to be individuals who have 
given substantial thought to potential policy reforms in the federal system, 
and who have proposals in respect of how such reforms, based on their 
experience in government, could be brought about (executed) in the 
context of political power—again, up to and including draft memoranda to 
cabinet, legal opinions in respect of potential Charter challenges and 
implementation plans that are sophisticated in respect of interdepartmental 
bureaucratic politics (not just Parliamentary dynamics).  Academics or 
theoreticians with no experience of government and former bureaucrats 
with little inclination to creative thinking would clearly not be well suited 
to occupy a large number of spots in such tanks, as the tanks would 
specifically serve the purpose of providing practical and realistic advice to 
their party leader for immediate or eventual implementation in 
government. 
 
The experience-cum-expertise of those in the political think tanks 
would serve to challenge the incumbency advantage of the civil service.  
And to challenge the huge division of labour advantage of the civil 
service, the think tanks would be substantial, impressive operations:  not 
small or boutique operations in the current idiom of independent Canadian 
think tanks and political party research shops, but significant 
organizations, consisting perhaps of a hundred or more genuine policy 
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people per party think tank, with credible coverage of all of the major 
policy areas.  The picture now gets serious… 
 
It may strike one as controversial, but strong consideration should 
be given to making these party think tanks state-funded.  The genesis of, 
and policy rationale for, this funding would be an enlightened realization 
by the government of the day (whatever its stripe) that our democracy is, 
over the long-run, ill-served by political parties that have negligible 
indigenous policy capacity.  Consistent state funding would therefore 
provide the backbone for a stable, standing policy capacity for each party.  
(Philanthropy in Canada is indeed growing rapidly, but under the current 
party and campaign financing regime, it is difficult to conceive of parties 
consistently raising an appropriate scale of funds to create stable think 
tanks—ahead of competing political priorities, no less.)  An outside 
ombudsman position could be created to ensure that parties are properly 
spending money on research and policy development, and not according to 
the current political party inclination to allow public relations and 
electioneering initiatives to cannibalize proper policy planning.  An 
ombudsman could also relieve the state (the government) of the difficult 
impression that it is somehow ‘prescribing’ or ‘dictating’ appropriate 
behaviour for the political parties—even if it effectively does so in myriad 
areas already.  
 
Far from usurping the role of the civil service, proper, state-funded 
political party think tanks in Canada would provide each of the political 
parties that really compete for political power in our country to be 
properly equipped with a standing policy bureaucracy that is its very own, 
and which systematically prepares plans and advice for it alone.  This 
innovation would doubtless enable the political party to propose more 
robust policy initiatives when in opposition (if it so wishes) or in the 
course of an election campaign (again, if it so wishes, and if election 
strategy permits).  Even in the absence of actual articulation of such 
substantive policy initiatives in an actual election campaign, a think tank 
capacity would afford the party the opportunity (again, if the party wishes 
to profit from it) to properly table and execute its ‘real’ plans when in 
power.  In the event, it could well be envisaged that many of those in the 
think tank who would have prepared the policy plans would, when the 
party forms government, come to populate some, if not most, of the PMO 
and the ministers’ offices.  A government could then presumably hit its 
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stride far more rapidly, and with greater punch; transitions of power would 
be smoother; and the civil service, while still playing its traditional 
advisory-administrative role, would get its ‘marching orders’ from 
political ‘masters’ who, by and large, know what they want, know of what 
they speak, and know with whom they are dealing—to wit, an increasingly 
complex and sophisticated regulatory bureaucracy. 
 
The real democratic deficit would be eased, if not solved.  To be 
sure, the party think tanks would be no panacea, nor would they be at all 
relevant in the case of a charlatan leader who ascends to power and yet 
wants nothing of real policy and reform.  The critical point, however, is 
that the think tanks become hyper-relevant in the event that a party 
leader—an aspiring prime minister—genuinely desires policy change; 
especially major or complex policy change.  In the event, the think tanks 
provide him or her and his or her party with critical tools (the necessary 
capacity) to meaningfully prepare for such change and, if the chutzpah be 
there, to lead and effect change when in government.  Our modern 
democracy should demand no less. 
 
 
